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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL M. SCHWARTZ, BERNICE
L. SCHWARTZ A.~D ALVIN I.
SMITH,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
Case No. 14832

vs.
M. D. HALTOM and MICHAEL
S. TANNER,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT M.D. HALTOM

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a civil action wherein a judgment was
entered against the defendants on the basis that through
their representations they obtained property to which they
were not entitled and defaulted on the promissory note
which evidenced such obligation.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Judgement was entered against the defendants,
jointly and severally.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant, M. o. Haltom, requests the
Court vacate the judgment entered by the lower court and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that he be awarded his costs herein.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The plaintiffs, Daniel M. Schwartz and Bernice
L. Schwartz, were owners of a house located at 1792
Millbrook Road, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which
was listed for sale beginning in 1966 when the plaintiffs
left the State of Utah and established residence in
California.

(T. 14)

Mr. and Mrs. Schwartz had authorized their
attorney in Salt Lake City, plaintiff, Alvin L. Smith,
to receive offers for purchase of the house and relay
them to California.

(T. 100)

Sometime in November of 1968, the defendant,
Stan Tanner, defendant, Earl J. Knudson, a real estate
broker, and appellant, M. D. Haltom, contacted Mr. Smith
at his office in Salt Lake City, Utah.

(T. 102)

Mr.

Haltom indicated that he represented the defendant, Stan
Tanner, a resident of Phoenix, Arizona (T. 102) and said
that Stan Tanner wanted to purchase the plaintiffs' house
in Salt Lake City, which he was going to give to his son,
Michael S. Tanner.

(T.104)

Mr. Haltom said any offer from

Stan Tanner was conditioned upon sale of the house to Stan
Tanner, free and clear of any mortgage.

At this meeting,

M. D. Haltom, as Stan Tanner's representative, discussed
with Mr. Smith (T. 112) the possible means of collateralizing
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the proposed purchase of the property and made some statements
regarding Stan Tanner's holding in the stock of several
corporations.

(T. 104 to T. 112)

On December 8, 1968, Daniel Schwartz met for a
period of two hours personally with the Appellant in San
Francisco, California.

{T. 15)

At this meeting Mr. Haltom

again indicated that he represented Stan Tanner, who wanted
to purchase a house in Salt Lake City which he was going
to give, free and clear, to Michael Tanner to induce the
Appellant to come to Utah from his residence in Phoenix
to operate a business in Salt Lake City in which Stan Tanner
had an interest.

{T. 16)

Mr. Haltom made an offer on

behalf of Stan Tanner to purchase the house for $47,000.00
the price at which it was listed.

(T. 17)

The balance of

the purchase price, after payment of an outstanding mortgage
of $3,000.00 was to be paid by a personal note executed
by Stan Tanner.

{T. 17)

Mr. Haltom also stated that

as security for the note, Stan Tanner would pledge certain
stock in Bishop Industries Incorporated and other stock.
(T. 18)

During this meeting Mr. Haltom made several

statements and representations about the above mentioned

.1

.i

corporation and several other companies,

United Equities

Company and Western St~tes Land of Utah.

(T. 18 to 24)

The plaintiff stated at the trial that at this time he did
request that Mr. Haltom become involved as a signator to
the note but that Mr. Haltom refused to sign the note.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(T. 81)

On January 2, 1969, Stan Tanner personally executed
and delivered to the plaintiffs a promissory note in the
principal amount of $40,643.00 with interest and this
Note was secured by a pledge of 10,000 shares of common
stock of Bishop Industries, Inc. and 20,000 shares common
stock of Western States Land of Utah owned by Stan Tanner.
(Exhibit 5-D) Contemporaneously, the plaintiffs, Daniel
and Bernice Schwartz executed a Warranty Deed in favor
of Michael S. Tanner and Louisa Tanner.

(Exhibit 6-D)

Michael S. Tanner was called as a witness by
the plaintiff.

(T. 154)

He testified that in November of

1968, he came to Salt Lake City to look for homes suitable
for his family after his father, Stan Tanner had offered
to purchase for him a home to induce him to live in Salt
Lake City and to take a position with his father's organization.

(T. 166, 167)

Michael Tanner, at this time, selected

three houses, one of which was the house owned by the plaintif'.'
(T. 168)

He stated that prior to the closing he did not

have any detailed conversations with either Mr. Haltom or
Stan Tanner.

(T. 183)

On February 20, 1969, the real property at issue
was mortgaged by Michael Tanner (T. 172 and Exhibit 17-P)
The funds obtained by the mortgage went to Jennifer Day
Enterprises, a Nevada corporation in which Stan Tanner
had an interest.

(T. 161, 173)

Michael Tanner lived in

the house for a period of one year at which time he moved
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out to find a more suitable residence.

(T. 181)

The note signed by Stan Tanner was unpaid at the
time of trial in the amount of $40,643.00.

(R. 76)

The trial court entered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs, Daniel M. Schwartz and Bernice L.Schwartz
against the defendant, M.D. Haltom, Stan Tanner and Michael
Tanner for $40,643.00 and $7,500.00 for attorney's fees.
(R. 80)

The Court also awarded the plaintiffs a judgment

against Stan Tanner for $21,870.29 for interest on the note.
(R. 80)
I.

THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF COMMON LAW
FRAUD ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANT, M. D. HALTOM.
The plaintiffs had the burden of establishing
all of the elements of a cause of action of fraud as
to the appellant,M. D. Haltom, which are according to
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P. 2d 273 (1952) as
follows:
1.

That a representation was made;

2.

Concerning a presently existing material fact;

3.

Which was false;

4.

Which the representor either
(a)

knew to be false, or

(b)

made recklessly, knowing that he had
sufficient knowledge upon which to base
-5-
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such representation;
5.

For the purpose of inducing the other party

to act upon it;
6.

That the other party, acting reasonably and

in belief of its falsity;
7.

Did in fact rely upon it;

8.

And was thereby induced to act;

9.

To his injury and damage.

The plaintiffs had the burden of proving each and
every element of conmton law fraud by clear and convincing
evidence.

Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation of America, 17

Utah 2d 114, 405 P. 2d 339 (1965) and Bezner v. Continental
Dry Cleaners, Inc. 548 P. 2d 898 (Utah 1976).
The appellant submits that the evidence presented
to the trial court does not sustain the finding of liability
on the basis of fraud against the appellant.
First, the trial court based the findings of liability
not upon the willful misrepresentations of fact of the appellant
as agent of Stan Tanner, or a participant in a company, but
rather upon the omrnissions of certain facts about the stocks.
(R. 74)

Paragraphs 12 (a), 12 (c), 12 (d), 12 (e), 12 (f), 12 (g),

12(h), 12(i) and 12(j) of the findings all concern matters
concerning the various holdings of Stan Tanner which were
not told to the plaicntiffs in the two hour meeting.

(R. ·,4)

In Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P. 2d 802
(1963) this Court set forth the general rule as to actionable

-6-
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concealment of the truth.
quoted 23

Am

Justice Wade, in his opinion

Jur. aso, Fraud and Deceit, Section 86,

which stated:
"Silence in order to be actionable fraud
must relate to a material matter
known to the party, whether the duty
arises from a relation of trust from
confidence, inequality of condition
and knowledge, or other attendant
circumstances • . . (Emphasis added
by Justice Wade )"394 P. 2d at 804.
The Court went on to cite the rule that the
duty to disclose does not arise if the other party could
fairly discover the information by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
In the present case, the transaction in which the
plaintiffs executed was accomplished on January 2, 1969, while
the representations made by M. D. Haltom were made on December
8, 1968.

In the intervening period the plaintiffs had the

time, opportunity and means of finding out all of the matters
undisclosed by M. D. Haltom concerning the corporations.
(T. 65, T. 67, and T. 146)

Therefore, in light of these facts

and the fact that this was a business transaction, there
existed no duty on the part of the appellant to affirmatively
relate the information to the plaintiffs upon which the
Court based the liability for fraud.
Secondly, the ommissions and misstatements specified
in the trial courts findings of fact, 12(a) through 12(j) are
not material statements.

In light of the facts and cir-

cumstances of the case, this can be determined by composing
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the evidence presented by the plaintiff, Daniel Schwartz

'

at trial with the instances relied on by the trial court
in the findings of fact.

At trial, the plaintiff primarily

testified as to the appellant's statements of opinion
concerning the future progress as to the possible development of the corporations.

(T. 21 to T. 25)

A careful

reading of the record reveals that the plaintiff was interest
primarily in the speculative value of the stock add not
the information cited in the findings of fact.
The appellant submits that under the standard of
clear and convincing evidence the

plaintiff~

failed to prove

all of the elements of fraud and therefore, the judgment
entered against this appellant should be reversed.
II.

THE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT EXERCISE DUE CARE IN THEIR
BUSINESS DEALINGS WITH

STAi.~

TANNER AND DID NOT HAVE ANY RIGHT

TO RELY ON THE STATEMENTS.
The plaintiff, Daniel Schwartz, was under a duty
to exercise reasonable care and prudence before entering
into an "arms-length" business transaction with the
defendant, Stan Tanner.
P.

2d 865 (1954).

Lewis v. White 2 Utah 2d 101, 269

Jardine v. Brunswick Corporation, 18 Utah

2d 378, 423 P. 2d 659 (1967).

If the plaintiff fails to exer-

cise reasonable care to protect his interests then under the
rule as stated in the foregoing cases, the plaintiff's
negligence precludes any claim that he reasonably relied on
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the representations and the plaintiff could not recover
in this action.
In the present case, the

plai~tiff

had the opport-

unity and ability to independently verify and substantiate
the value of the stock being offered as security for the
note.

(T. 65)

At trial he stated that he contacted a

broker in New York concerning the value of the stock.
He also contacted a banker.

(T. 67)

(T. 65)

The plaintiff did not

have a credit check made of Stan Tanner the person signing
the note.

(T. 67)

After the December 8, 1968 meeting,

and until January 1969 closing the plaintiff had the
opportunity and ability to investigate the representations
and determine whether or not he should rely on the information
communicated to him in the two hour meeting with M. D. Haltom
concerning the stock of Stan Tanner.
Furthermore, the plaintiff was represented by
legal counsel, Alvin I. Smith, who had previously known
Mr. Stan Tanner and told the plaintiff that the stock
was speculative stock.

(T. 146)

The plaintiff relied on the

representations of Mr. Smith, who had personally made some
investigations of Bishop Industries stock and who had personally
purchased some of the stock at the same period of time.

(T. 148)

The appellant submits that in light of the foregoing
circumstances, the decision of the trial court should be
reversed because the plaintiff was not entitled to reasonably
rely on the representations made by M. D. Haltom on behalf
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of Stan Tanner in selling the property and, therefore, the
judgment should be reversed.
III.

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PLAINTIFFS AT
TRIAL DOES NOT SUSTAIN THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING OF
APPELLANTS INVOLVEMENT IN A CONSPIRACY.
The Trial court in the Findings of Fact entered
in this action based the liability of the appellant,
M. D. Haltom upon his involvement as a conspirator in
a plan to defaud the plaintiffs.

The trial court found

in paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact that Michael Tanner,

M. D. Haltom, and Stan Tanner had acted at all times in
concert in a scheme and plan to defraud the plaintiffs.
(R.

70)
In the case of Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368

P. 2d 567 (1962) the plaintiffs sought to establish liability
on the basis of conspiracy to cause a breach of contract.
The court held that no conspiracy had been proven because
the evidence had not shown that the parties were engaged
in a concerted action to cause the breach of contract, nor
did the evidence show that such action was, in fact, done
for the group or part of a plan.

The court cited as authority

for this proposition the case of Teamsters, Chauffers

& Help~

of America Local 222 v. Board of Review, Department of EmplQY:
ment Security, 10 Utah 2d 63, 348 P. 2d 588 (1960).

In the

Teamsters case,the Court stated the general proposition that
-10-
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there is no basis for holding a group of persons responsible
for the acts of one unless it is affirmatively established
that the group is engaged in a concerted activity and that
the action of one is, in fact, done for the group as part
of a plan.
Because the plaintiffs alleged that there existed
a conspiracy to defraud, the burden to prove the existence
of such conspiracy is even greater than most other civil
cases.

In Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation of America, 17

Utah 2d 339, 405, states the general rule that fraud must
be proven by the plaintiff by clear and convincing evidence and

that a cause of action will not lie in mere suspicion or
innuendo raised by the relationship of the parties.

See

also, Tanner v. Pillsbury Mills, 3 Utah 2d 196, 281 P. 2d 391
(1955), and Harris v. Capital Records, 50 Cal. Rptr. 539,
413 P. 2d 139 (1966).
In the present case, the evidence established that
M. D. Haltom made the representations to the plaintiffs
concerning the stock which Stan Tanner was to pledge as
security for the note.

However, the actual purchase was

made by Stan Tanner and it was Stan Tanner who defaulted
the note.

There is no evidence that M. D. Haltom had

any knowledge that the note would not be paid at the
time the statements were made or any other evidence of
a conspiracy or plan to defraud.

-11-
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I
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing points, the
appellant, M. D. Haltom, submits the judgment entered in the
lower court should be reversed and the appellant awarded
his costs in this matter.
Respectfully Submitted,

ROBERT VAN SCIVER
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
M. D. Haltom
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